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A BREAK IN THE INTERNET PRIVACY CHAIN: HOW LAW
ENFORCEMENT CONNECTS CONTENT TO NON-CONTENT
TO DISCOVER AN INTERNET USER’S IDENTITY
∗

Laura J. Tyson

Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.
. . . The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most
1
intimate occurrences of the home.

I.

INTRODUCTION

2

Katie Talbot knew her next-door neighbor was fraudulently collecting state unemployment benefits while he simultaneously worked
a job that paid cash under the table. Talbot considered using her
state’s anonymous whistle-blower Web page to report the fraud, but
she was afraid that investigators might be able to learn her identity
through her computer’s Internet Protocol (IP) address and that her
neighbor might somehow discover the source of the report. Talbot
knew that Web surfing she did from her home computer could leave
3
on any Web site that she visited a “digital fingerprint,” which someone might later use to uncover her identity.

∗

J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 1987, University of Miami. The author would like to thank Professor Gaia Bernstein for her valuable guidance and advice regarding this Comment, and also members of the Seton Hall Law
Review Board of Officers, especially Chester R. Ostrowski, Ashley Ochs, and Trevor F.
Berrett, for their assistance.
1
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2
Pseudonym used to protect this individual’s identity.
3
Eric R. Diez, Comment, “One Click, You’re Guilty”: A Troubling Precedent for Internet Child Pornography and the Fourth Amendment, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 786 (2006)
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Unlike Talbot, many Internet users are unaware that their Internet activities leave a trail of evidence that law enforcement can use to
4
determine their identity. David Lat—a young lawyer who worked at
the United States Attorney’s office in Newark, New Jersey—learned
the harsh lesson regarding his privacy on the Internet. By day, Lat
5
worked as an assistant federal prosecutor. At night, in the privacy of
his New York City apartment, he penned the satirical blog titled “Underneath Their Robes”—a humorous look at the personal lives of
6
federal judges. Lat used the same computer to respond to blog emails and personal e-mails, and his decision to do so ultimately cost
7
him his anonymity as the author of the blog. A former law clerk for
a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uncovered
Lat’s true identity as the blogger by comparing the IP address embedded in the header of an e-mail the clerk had received from Lat
with the IP address in an e-mail received from the still-unknown
8
blogger. The IP addresses matched, meaning that both e-mails originated from the same computer and that Lat was most likely the au9
thor of “Underneath Their Robes.” Had the clerk not received an email from Lat, he would likely have been unable to uncover the blogger’s identity, as he would have been unable to compare the IP ad-

(using the phrase “digital fingerprints”); see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment
as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 126 (2007) (observing that “[d]ue to
changes in technology and the realities of modern life, much First Amendment activity now leaves digital fingerprints beyond private zones protected by the Fourth
Amendment” and that “Internet surfing in the seclusion of one’s own home creates
data trails with third parties in distant locations”).
4
See Joel Michael Schwarz, A Case of Identity: A Gaping Hole in the Chain of Evidence
of Cyber-Crime, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 92, 93 (2003) (“[M]ost people fail to appreciate exactly how personal information on the Internet is captured and used. . . . [A]
person creates a record of activity from the moment that person logs on to the Internet, from every Web site that the person visits to every e-mail that the person sends.”
(citation omitted)).
5
Jonathan Miller, He Fought the Law. They Both Won., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, §
14 (N.J. Weekly), at 1.
6
Id.; see also Underneath Their Robes, http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com
(last visited June 14, 2010).
7
Telephone Interview with David Lat, Founding Editor, Above the Law (Nov. 5,
2008).
8
Telephone Interview with David Lat, supra note 7; E-mail from David Lat,
Founding Editor, Above the Law, to Author (Feb. 17, 2009, 09:32 EST) (on file with
author).
9
Telephone Interview with David Lat, supra note 7.
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dress of the blogger against a known reference, the IP address from
10
Lat’s e-mail.
Federal law enforcement agents frequently use an IP address to
determine the identity of an Internet user. With only an administrative subpoena, agents can require an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
to hand over the name, address, phone numbers, credit card information, and other personal information of a person using a particu11
lar IP address. In fact, law enforcement agents routinely use the IP
12
address captured by a Web site to discover the user’s identity. Are
Internet users bothered by the fact that the government uses the invisible trail of evidence that their computer’s IP address leaves on
Web sites as a tool to uncover their personal information, including
their names, addresses, and phone numbers? And do Internet users
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal information they give to their ISP? Many federal courts have answered this
13
second question with an unequivocal “no,” which places this privacy
10

See Microsoft Office, Outlook, View E-mail Message Headers,
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/HA012303001033.aspx#1 (last visited
June 14, 2010) (explaining how to view and translate e-mail message headers).
11
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 326–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(explaining how law enforcement agents obtained access log records from the server
hosting a suspect child-pornography Web site, extracted the IP addresses of every
computer used to visit the Web site from the log, and then issued a subpoena to the
ISP to obtain subscriber information), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
13
See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the defendant’s use of peer-to-peer software, which permitted others
on the Internet to access certain folders in his computer, “could expose his subscriber information to outsiders” and that the defendant thus had no Fourth Amendment
privacy expectation in subscriber information held by his ISP); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “e-mail and Internet users
have no expectation of privacy in the to / from addresses of their messages or the IP
addresses of the [Web sites] they visit because they should know that this information
is provided to and used by [ISPs] for the specific purpose of directing the routing of
information”); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers. . .
. They may not, however, enjoy such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over
the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient.” (citations omitted)); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “computer users
do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person—the system operator” (citations omitted)); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11–
12 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (holding no legitimate expectation of privacy in noncontent subscriber information provided to an ISP), aff’g 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508–09
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interest outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, in
2001, Congress enacted laws that further reduced Internet users’ privacy by allowing law enforcement to obtain a broader range of infor15
mation about individual subscribers from an ISP.
In light of the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in
Smith v. Maryland, courts have recognized that in the context of a
Fourth Amendment search, the contents of a communication receive
16
greater privacy protection than non-content information.
Accordingly, federal statutes that provide privacy protections for Internet
communications generally give the contents of a communication (for
example, the body of an e-mail) broader protection than the noncontent portion (such as the “To” and “From” addresses found in the
17
header of the e-mail). To require an ISP to disclose the contents of
(W.D. Va. 1999); United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007)
(“The Smith line of cases has led federal courts to uniformly conclude that Internet
users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information, the
length of their stored files, and other noncontent data to which service providers
must have access.”); Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D.
Conn. 2005) (“In the cases in which the issue has been considered, courts have universally found that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a subscriber does not
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his subscriber information.”); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005) (“The courts
that have already addressed this issue . . . uniformly have found that individuals have
no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in subscriber information given to an ISP.”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information
provided to an ISP); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan.
2000) (“Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated when [his ISP] divulged
his subscriber information to the government. Defendant has not demonstrated an
objectively reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy in his subscriber information.”).
14
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests that a person has
actually exhibited and that society recognizes as reasonable).
15
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) (broadening the scope of information available
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) to include, among other things, “any temporarily assigned network address”).
16
See 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (refusing to recognize an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers captured by a pen register because “pen registers do not
acquire the contents of communications”).
17
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (requiring a warrant for disclosure of the
contents of an electronic communication in electronic storage), with § 2703(c)(2)
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an Internet-based communication, the government must first obtain
18
a search warrant supported by probable cause. When the government merely seeks the identity of an Internet user, however, no showing of cause is required—the government must simply serve an ad19
ministrative subpoena on the ISP. An Internet user’s IP address
thus provides law enforcement a quick and easy way to learn that user’s identity.
Recent court rulings and federal laws have stifled the sense of
freedom and anonymity individuals enjoy while using the Internet.
Some might think that the quip made by Sun Microsystems CEO
20
Scott McNealy that “you already have zero privacy—get over it” has
become a self-fulfilled prophecy and that “Internet privacy” is nothing but an oxymoron. To prevent that from happening, this Comment argues that courts should consider a different approach when
responding to questions of the level of privacy an Internet user seeks
and deserves. Because the content of a Web site can reveal highly
personal information about the individual who visits it, the personally
identifiable information attached to an IP address deserves greater
privacy protections than federal courts and legislation presently allow. Courts should more closely scrutinize the distinction between
the content and non-content portions of an Internet communication
rather than rely on antiquated doctrines that do not adequately address all of the possible privacy concerns.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of Internet
technology and explains ways that law enforcement has used the Internet to catch criminals. Part III discusses federal sources of privacy
protection in Internet use, including both statutory protections and
early court decisions. Part IV discusses a New Jersey case, State v. Reid,
which held that, under the New Jersey Constitution, Internet users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber informa21
tion held by their ISPs. Part V explains why the methods and analo-

(mandating that an ISP disclose its subscriber’s personal information, including
name, address, phone numbers, and billing information upon the presentation of an
administrative subpoena).
18
See § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A).
19
See § 2703(c)(2).
20
John Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1999, at A1.
21
945 A.2d 26, 28, 33–34 (N.J. 2008).
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gies used by courts in the past have not always resulted in the best decisions and provides suggestions for courts to follow when dealing
with cases involving an Internet user’s privacy rights.
II. A QUICK OVERVIEW OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGY
The means by which an IP address is created, assigned to a particular user, and becomes integrated with that user’s Internet communications provides an important backdrop for understanding how
22
law enforcement uses an IP address in investigations.
A. Internet Basics
To access the Internet from home, a user must start with two
things—an Internet-ready computer and an ISP. The ISP provides
the necessary physical link between the computer and the Internet by
supplying the household with either a cable modem or digital23
subscriber-line (DSL) modem. Every Internet modem has a unique
24
serial number called a media-access-control (MAC) address, on
which the ISP relies to distinguish one modem from another, such as
the modem that connects the house located at 10 Main Street from
25
the modem that connects the house at 12 Main Street. The ISP automatically assigns a unique number—the IP address—to the modem

22
See generally United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505–06 (9th Cir. 2008)
(describing how law enforcement used surveillance of defendant’s e-mail and Internet activity to uncover evidence of a massive Ecstasy manufacturing lab).
23
See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4803 (2002) (explaining that residential highspeed Internet access is provided over coaxial cables “in the form of cable modem
service offered by cable [companies], and over copper wires in the form of digital
subscriber line (DSL) services offered by local” phone companies); see also ANDREW S.
TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 58–59 (4th ed. 2003) (describing the function of
an ISP).
24
See United States v. Schuster, 467 F.3d 614, 618 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A ‘MAC
address,’ or media access control address, is a unique number assigned to the hardware of a particular computer or other device.”); see also IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, IEEE
STANDARD FOR LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKS: OVERVIEW AND
ARCHITECTURE 6 (2002); J.D. Biersdorfer, Making a Network Members-Only, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2005, at C10.
25
See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 178 n.34 (D. Mass.
2008) (“The MAC address is used by the ISP in routing information through the
network and is specific to the user’s computer.”).
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26

at each of its subscriber’s locations. Thus, the ISP uses the IP address to identify different households.
27
An IP address consists of four numbers separated by periods.
For example, one’s IP address might be 68.100.108.40. The Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority manages all IP addresses and allocates
large blocks of IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries, which in
turn allocate smaller blocks to ISPs, such as Comcast, Verizon, and
28
Cox. The result is that every modem that connects a household to
the Internet receives a unique IP address, and the ISP is the only organization that can translate a particular IP address to a particular
household and to the individual responsible for paying the monthly
29
Internet bill.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
coordinates the assignment of Internet domain names—for example,
www.textbooks.com—with the allocation of IP addresses to make sure
that each IP address is unique and that all Internet users can access
30
all valid Web addresses.
Within an individual household, computers connect to the
modem either by way of an Ethernet cable or via a wireless router. A
wireless router provides the user with the flexibility to access the Internet using a laptop computer from any location in the house. Many
people leave their wireless networks unsecured, which renders the
31
network open to access by anyone else with a laptop. Although
some may do this on purpose, many fail to enable their wireless router’s security due to confusion or ignorance about how wireless rou-

26
See Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2006)
(stating that “[a]ny computer from which a person accesses the [I]nternet is assigned
an IP address”).
27
United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007).
28
See
Internet
Assigned
Numbers
Authority,
Number
Resources,
http://www.iana.org/numbers (last visited June 14, 2010).
29
An IP address by itself does not reveal a subscriber’s name, address, or social
security number. Klimas, 465 F.3d at 276 n.2. An Internet subscriber’s personal information can only be determined by matching the IP address up with the data held
by the ISP. Id.
30
See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.icann.org/en/faq (last visited June 14, 2010).
31
See Timothy B. Lee, Op-Ed, Hop on My Bandwidth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at
A27.
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32

ters work. Many manufacturers ship wireless routers from the factory with default security modes disabled, which leaves the unsuspecting user’s network vulnerable to “piggybacking”—a third party’s un33
authorized use of an open Internet network. Additionally, many
modems have wireless security features disabled by default to provide
34
the user with an easier and quicker configuration. A typical user
might purchase the modem, use the “wizard” set-up to facilitate the
installation, and then happily begin surfing the Internet, oblivious of
the fact that the next-door neighbors can now also surf the Internet,
35
thanks to the open network. That user would likewise be unaware
of a piggybacker’s use of the network to conduct unlawful activity and
might be surprised when confronted by federal agents asking questions about alleged downloads of child pornography.
When a person surfing the Internet clicks to view a particular
Web site, that click triggers a flow of data from the computer out to
the Internet. The data flow begins when the user either types in the
36
Web site’s Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and presses “enter” on
the computer keyboard or simply clicks on a link to a Web site. The
click translates into a data stream from the computer to the cable or
DSL modem supplied by the ISP. From the modem, the communication travels across the physical cable or DSL connection linking the
subscriber’s house to the ISP’s main switching office where, guided
by the destination IP address embedded in the original communica-

32
See id. (“Perhaps the biggest problem [with open wireless networks] is that
many people leave their networks open from ignorance.”).
33
NETGEAR INC., ROUTER SETUP MANUAL 1-9 (2007), available at
ftp://downloads.netgear.com/files/
WGT624v4_SM_30Apr07.pdf (“Once you have established basic wireless connectivity, you can enable security settings appropriate to your needs.”); see also Matthew
Hottell, Defaults vs. Rational Choice: The Case of Home-Based Wireless Security, 3 J.L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 319, 336 (2007) (concluding that default settings on wireless routers are a driving cause of consumers failing to secure their wireless networks).
34
See Hottell, supra note 33, at 326–27 (noting that “[h]ome-based wireless access
points are usually . . . left in a default, unsecure configuration” and describing the
trouble through which a typical, uninformed consumer would have to go to enable
wireless security for each computer in the household); see also NETGEAR INC., supra
note 33, at 1-9.
35
See Michel Marriott, Hey Neighbor, Stop Piggybacking on My Wireless, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2006, § 1, at 1.
36
See United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 n.12 (D. Mass. 2007)
(explaining how a URL works).
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tion, it reaches its proper destination—the physical server that hosts
the Web site’s content.
An Internet communication like the one just described has two
components, content and non-content, and the distinction between
the two is crucial. Content generally includes “any information con37
cerning the substance, purport, or meaning of a communication,”
which includes the information found in the body of e-mail messages,
e-mail attachments, and Instant Messages, as well as any other subs38
tantive information stored on an ISP’s server. The non-content portion of an Internet communication—typically called the “header”—
39
includes both the originating and destination IP addresses. Every
communication sent across the Internet contains both the source
40
computer’s IP address and the destination computer’s IP address.
Non-content data helps ensure that the communication arrives
at its intended target. For example, if a user points his Internet
browser to www.google.com, the header information in the communication assures that the user’s desire to see the Google page is fulfilled and that the user is not directed to some other location instead.
The user’s IP address embedded in the header also assures that, after
the Google Web page receives the initial query, its response—the data, graphics, and text it sends back—arrives at the correct physical location. Thus, if Bob in Boise runs a search on Google for “Sonia Sotomayor,” the results do not end up on the computer screen
belonging to Paul in Pittsburgh. Even if a user does not specifically
run a search but merely clicks on a Web page to view it, the Web site
41
can capture the user’s IP address. As such, users inadvertently leave
42
digital fingerprints on every Web site they visit.

37

18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 429 (2006) (explaining that content is
the substance of the communication delivered); see also id. at 449 (“Contents of
communications are the substance of the message communicated from sender to receiver.”).
39
See TANENBAUM, supra note 23, at 434.
40
KERR, supra note 38, at 394.
41
See generally Schwarz, supra note 4, at 97 (describing how Web servers capture
visitor’s IP addresses).
42
See Solove, supra note 3, at 126 (“Internet surfing in the seclusion of one’s own
home creates data trails [akin to digital fingerprints] with third parties in distant locations.”).
38
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B. The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity
The Internet offers a nearly endless array of opportunities for
criminals to conduct illegal activities. Some criminals use e-mail as a
43
convenient way to exchange child pornography. Others have used
the purported privacy of a chat room to exchange illicit files and data
44
with other members of the chat room. Computer hackers rely on
the Internet to locate different Web sites from which to damage or
45
steal data. For each of these scenarios, law enforcement has powerful tools to determine the identity of the criminal. For example, if a
law enforcement agent lurking in an Internet chat room observes
evidence of illegal conduct, the agent can record the user’s screen
name and IP address and then contact the ISP to obtain the user’s
46
identification. Second, a Web master who notices suspicious conduct from an anonymous user visiting a site can capture the user’s IP
47
address and forward it to law enforcement. Third, law enforcement
can target a particular Web page and obtain a log of IP addresses
48
from the host. Once law enforcement has that user’s IP address, it
only needs to issue an administrative subpoena to the ISP to obtain
49
the user’s identity.

43
See, e.g., Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (describing how a defendant e-mailed child pornography to a California Sheriff’s Department detective who had lurked in a chat room designated for individuals with an interest in children).
44
See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008).
45
See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 2007)
(describing how a college student in Madison, Wisconsin hacked into a corporate
server located in San Diego); State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 27 (N.J. 2008) (describing
how a disgruntled employee changed the login password and shipping address of her
employer’s account information on its vendor’s Web sites).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000);
United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 505 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18665 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam).
47
See, e.g., Reid, 945 A.2d at 29. In Reid, an Internet-technology (IT) specialist noticed that one of his client’s accounts had been modified in a suspicious way. Id.
The IT specialist notified the client of the suspicious activity and provided him with
the IP address of the computer that was used to make the changes. Id. The client
then gave the IP address to law enforcement personnel. Id.
48
See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2009).
49
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006) (requiring the government to issue an administrative subpoena to an ISP to obtain a subscriber’s name, address, and phone
number).
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The above examples illustrate how law enforcement uses either
content- or non-content-based information to learn the identity of a
suspect. In the first example, law enforcement uses non-contentbased information—the user’s IP address—to determine the user’s
identity. In the third example, law enforcement starts with the content—the Web page visited by the user—and works backwards from
there to determine the user’s identity. The third example raises the
question of whether Internet users can expect privacy in the substance and contents of the Web sites they visit. Internet users might
rightfully object to the intrusion on their privacy that occurs when
law enforcement collects the log of IP addresses from a particular
Web site and, with the help of the ISP, identifies the users who
clicked on the Web site. Moreover, Internet users might be surprised
at the lack of available sources of privacy protection on which to rely
to protect those interests.
III. SOURCES OF INTERNET PRIVACY PROTECTION
Internet users seeking to maintain the privacy of the personally
identifiable information held by their ISP may look to several possibly
overlapping sources of privacy protection: those inherent in the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, those inherent in individual state constitutions, and those that Congress has created and
enacted as federal statutes. Federal courts, when deciding the constitutional questions surrounding privacy in Internet use, often turn to
and cite the statutory protections. Thus, this Comment will discuss
those protections first.
A. Statutory Sources of Internet Privacy Protection: The Stored
Communications Act
Congress developed the statutory framework that applies to protect the privacy considerations of electronic communications in the
mid-1980s, years before the Internet achieved widespread public
50
51
use. Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in
1986 as part of a broad swath of privacy protections enacted under

50

See TANENBAUM, supra note 23, at 57 (explaining that until the early 1990s, the
Internet was used primarily by government, academics, and industrial researchers).
51
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006).
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). Congress enacted the ECPA in an effort to balance the government’s
need to obtain evidence with the public’s desire to maintain the privacy of electronic communications and electronically stored informa53
tion. According to the Department of Justice, Congress intended
that the ECPA would “fill in the gaps” left by the uncertain application of Fourth Amendment protections to Internet communica54
tions. When law enforcement attempts to learn the identity of an
anonymous Internet user, the ECPA—and, more specifically, the
55
SCA —controls how and when an ISP may disclose that information.
1.

Content and Non-Content

The SCA controls both the disclosure of an Internet user’s personally identifiable information and the disclosure of the contents of
an Internet-based communication, and it treats these two categories
56
quite differently. Thus, to understand the SCA, it is first necessary
to understand the differences between content and non-content information as used in the Act. The SCA draws its definitions from
57
§ 2510 of the ECPA, which defines “content” as “any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning” of a communica58
tion. Applied in the context of an Internet communication, content
includes the information in the body of an e-mail and any files sent as
59
e-mail attachments. Non-content includes a “record or other infor-

52
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
53
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555
(stating that the ECPA’s purpose was to clarify federal privacy protections in light of
“dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies”).
54
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 82 (2002), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm.
55
See §§ 2701–12.
56
Compare § 2703(b) (controlling the disclosure of the contents of an electronic
communication), with § 2703(c) (controlling the disclosure of the records pertaining
to an Internet subscriber).
57
§ 2711(1).
58
Id. § 2510(8).
59
See KERR, supra note 38, at 449 (“Contents of communications are the substance of the message communicated from sender to receiver, while non-content information refers to the information used to deliver the communications from send-
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mation” pertaining to a subscriber or a customer. The statute does
not define what “other information” about a subscriber is considered
non-content, but at a minimum, “other information” includes the
subscriber’s name, address, local and long-distance phoneconnection records, records of Internet-session times and durations,
length of service (including the start date) and types of service used,
telephone or other subscriber number or identity (including any
temporarily assigned network address), and the means of payment
61
for the service (including credit card or bank account numbers).
Thus, under the SCA, non-content information includes a vast
amount of personal information about an Internet subscriber.
2.

Voluntary Disclosure of Personal Information

Section 2702 of the SCA controls an ISP’s voluntary disclosure of
62
subscriber records. It generally prohibits the voluntary disclosure of
63
customer communications and subscriber records.
It specifically
prohibits an ISP from voluntarily disclosing an Internet subscriber’s
record or “other information pertaining to a subscriber or a customer
64
of such service” to a government entity, but it does not restrict the
65
disclosure of this information to a private entity. As a matter of policy, however, many ISPs will not voluntarily disclose a subscriber’s
66
personal information.
Privacy policies vary from one ISP to the

ers to receivers and other network-generated information about the communication.”).
60
§ 2703(c)(1).
61
§ 2703(c)(2).
62
§ 2702.
63
§ 2702(a).
64
§ 2702(a)(3).
65
§ 2702(c)(6) (allowing an ISP to divulge subscriber information to “any person
other than a governmental entity”).
66
For example, Cox Cable’s High Speed Internet Privacy Policy provides,
We consider any personally identifiable information we receive about
you to be confidential, and it is our policy to use it only in providing
our websites and our cable television, internet and telephone services—from sales and installation, to operations, administration, advertising, marketing, support, network provision, maintenance, communications with you, billing, collection and in other ways related to our
services.
Cox Communications, Privacy Policy, http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/policies/yourprivacy-rights.cox (last visited June 14, 2010).
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67

next. For example, the AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) Web site
promises its members that personal information will not be shared
68
with third parties unless the member consents. Section 2702(a)(3)
of the SCA merely prohibits an ISP from voluntarily disclosing personal information about an Internet subscriber to the government,
69
but the exception to this general prohibition —which essentially
gives the government access to the same information whenever it
70
wants —reduces the provision’s effective privacy protections. Thus,
§ 2702 provides Internet subscribers with a minimal threshold of privacy protection which an ISP, if it so chooses, may exceed.
3.

Required Disclosure of Personal Information

When the government requires an ISP to disclose the personally
identifiable information associated with an Internet user, § 2703(c)
71
of the SCA applies. This subsection allows the government to obtain
a vast range of personal information about an Internet user, including the user’s name, address, phone number, and billing informa72
tion.
Section 2703(c) further divides “records” into one of two
groups: the information available to the government under

67

See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing the
variety of ISP agreements and the resulting expectations of privacy that may come
from them).
68
AIM’s privacy policy states:
Your AIM information consists of personally identifiable information
collected or received about you . . . . [It] may include registrationrelated information (such as name, home or work addresses, e-mail
addresses, telephone and fax numbers, birth date or gender); transaction-related information (such as credit card or other preferred means
of payment, or a history of products purchased through AIM) . . . .
....
. . . Your AIM information will not be shared with third parties unless it is necessary to fulfill a transaction you have requested, or in other circumstances in which you have consented to the sharing of your
AIM information.
AIM Privacy Policy, http://www.aim.com/tos/privacy_policy.adp#how (last visited
June 14, 2010).
69
§ 2702(c)(1) (stating that an ISP may divulge an Internet subscriber’s records
or other information pertaining to the subscriber to the government as authorized
under § 2703).
70
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
71
See § 2703(c).
72
Id.
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§ 2703(c)(1), captioned a “record or other information pertaining to
73
a subscriber”; and the list of information available to the government under § 2703(c)(2), which computer-crime legal scholar Orin
74
Kerr refers to as “basic subscriber information.” The phrase “basic
subscriber information” may be an understatement, however, as the
list of information available to the government under § 2703(c)(2)
extends well beyond “basic.” Rather, “basic subscriber information”
includes the Internet subscriber’s name, address, local and longdistance telephone-connection records, length of service and types of
service used, IP address, and method of payment for the service, in75
cluding credit card account numbers or bank account numbers.
Thus, to more accurately convey the breadth of information available
to the government under § 2703(c)(2), this Comment will refer to
the list as “detailed subscriber information.”
The SCA does not define the meaning of “record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” and few reported cases have in76
terpreted the phrase.
Thus, the difference between information
available under these two subsections is not altogether clear. The legislative history simply notes that “the information involved is information about the customer’s use of the service[,] not the content of the
77
customer’s communications.”
Despite the lack of clarity in the differences between the information available to law enforcement under subsection (c)(1) and
subsection (c)(2), one thing is clear: law enforcement can much
more easily obtain the information available under (c)(2) than it can
obtain the information available under (c)(1). Under § 2703(c)(1),
law enforcement may require an ISP to disclose a “record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” only if law enforcement meets

73

§ 2703(c)(1).
§ 2703(c)(2); Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219 (2004) (describing
the list of items available to law enforcement under § 2703(c)(2) as “basic subscriber
information”).
75
§ 2703(c)(2).
76
In re Pen Register & Trap / Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (pointing out that no reported case has interpreted the phrase “record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service”).
77
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592.
74
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78

one of four requirements. Law enforcement must obtain a warrant
according to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, obtain a court order, obtain the consent of the subscriber to
the disclosure, or submit a formal written request relevant to an in79
vestigation of telemarketing fraud.
On the other hand, under
§ 2703(c)(2), law enforcement is only required to present an administrative subpoena to require an ISP to disclose detailed subscriber in80
formation. Alternatively, law enforcement may present either a federal or state grand jury or trial subpoena to obtain detailed subscriber
81
information. Finally, whether law enforcement seeks a “record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber” or detailed subscriber
information, it is not required to give notice to the subscriber that it
82
has or will obtain the information.
The amount of personal information about an Internet user
available to the government has not always been so plentiful. In 2001
Congress updated and expanded the SCA when it enacted the USA
83
PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act). Enacted to deter and punish terroristic
threats and to enhance law enforcement’s investigatory tools, the Patriot Act expanded the scope of information that law enforcement
84
could obtain with a mere administrative subpoena. The amendments under the Patriot Act added “records of session times and durations,” and “any temporarily assigned network address” to the list of
information available to law enforcement under the detailed sub85
scriber information category found in § 2703(c)(2). In the Internet
context, the “temporarily assigned network address” includes the IP
86
address assigned to the subscriber by the ISP for a particular session.
78

§ 2703(c)(1).
Id.
80
§ 2703(c)(2).
81
Id.
82
§ 2703(c).
83
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18,
22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
84
See id. § 210 .
85
§ 2703(c)(2).
86
See, e.g., United States v. Li, No. 07-CR-2915, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22283, at *7
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008) (holding that administrative subpoenas issued by the government to obtain information and login histories, including the date and time of,
79
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Law enforcement uses this information to identify and trace the physical location of an Internet user suspected of engaging in criminal ac87
tivity. The Patriot Act amendments also allowed law enforcement to
obtain the “means and source of payment” used to pay for service, in88
cluding “any credit card or bank account number.” This change
decreases the likelihood that a subscriber can hide behind a false
name and address. Overall, the amendments made to § 2703 under
the Patriot Act broadened the scope of information available to the
89
government. Notably, those amendments were not subject to the
90
Patriot Act’s sunset provision.
In summary, when law enforcement seeks to learn the identity of
an unknown Internet user and only has the IP address of the computer used to gain access to the Internet, it only needs to serve an
administrative subpoena on the ISP to unlock a wealth of information
91
about the user.
B. Before the Internet: Early Fourth Amendment Communications
Privacy
The cases that shaped the early development of Fourth Amendment communications privacy protections have had a remarkable
impact on the modern decisions relating to an Internet user’s privacy
interests. What is significant is how the courts decide which privacy
interests fall inside or outside the scope of a Fourth Amendment protected search.
The Fourth Amendment provides the right of the people to be
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” and protects
92
against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” To determine whether a government intrusion on a privacy interest constitutes a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the interest must satisfy the test outlined
93
in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States. An individuand IP address used for, each login for a particular user name, were authorized under the SCA).
87
See supra Part II.B.
88
§ 2703(c)(2)(F).
89
See USA PATRIOT Act § 224.
90
Id.
91
See § 2703(c)(2).
92
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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al must show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area into
which the government has intruded, and that expectation of privacy
94
must be one that society recognizes as reasonable.
In Katz, the
Court was asked to decide whether the government’s use of an electronic listening device placed on a public telephone booth violated
95
the telephone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy. After recognizing the vital role that the public telephone played in providing
private communications, the Court held that the device violated the
petitioner’s privacy and thus constituted a Fourth Amendment pro96
tected search.
Katz also reinforced the doctrine that information that a person
“knowingly exposes to the public” does not merit Fourth Amendment
97
protection. This doctrine controlled the decision in United States v.
98
Miller, which in turn influenced subsequent Internet privacy deci99
sions. In Miller, the Court held that law enforcement’s procurement
of a suspect’s bank records did not constitute an intrusion into a
100
Fourth Amendment protected interest.
Offering three reasons to
support its holding, the Court first concluded that the documents
(which included checks and other bank records) were not confidential communications but were negotiable instruments used in com101
mercial transactions.
Second, the Court noted that the complainant voluntarily conveyed the information to the banks and its
102
employees in the ordinary course of business. Third, the Court reasoned that the complainant could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy regarding his bank records because Congress had said
103
as much by enacting the Bank Secrecy Act.
The Court reiterated
94

Id.
Id. at 349 (majority opinion).
96
Id. at 352–53.
97
Id. at 351.
98
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
99
See, e.g., cases cited infra note 128.
100
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
101
Id. at 442.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 442–43. The Supreme Court previously upheld the constitutionality of
the Bank Secrecy Act. See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 69–70 (1974). In
Shultz, the Court announced that a bank complying with the Bank Secrecy Act “neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment
right.” Id. at 54.
95
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that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from
obtaining information that an individual revealed to a third party
even if the individual reveals the information to the third party on
104
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.
In the 1979 case Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court considered whether a warrantless installation of a pen register at the
phone company to record numbers dialed from a private home
105
amounted to a search. The Court first determined that because the
pen register had been installed at the phone company, the petitioner
could not argue that his property was invaded or that the government
106
intruded upon a “constitutionally protected area.” The Court next
considered whether an individual has an expectation of privacy in the
107
It rejected the petiphone numbers dialed from a home phone.
tioner’s privacy claim, holding that because telephone users typically
know that they must convey information to the phone company and
because the phone company records this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes, telephone users could not claim any
108
expectation that the phone numbers they dial would remain secret.
In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that “subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged,” but nonetheless it was
“too much to believe” that telephone users would expect that the
109
numbers they dial remain a secret.
Significant to the Court’s analysis in Smith was its distinction between the contents of a phone call—the actual spoken communication, which Katz recognized as protected—and the non-content por110
tion of the phone call, the number dialed. This distinction between
content and non-content has influenced modern cases that decided
111
Thus, both Miller and Smith are significant
Internet privacy issues.
for the impact they have had on modern courts attempting to untangle privacy issues stemming from Internet communications.
104

Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
442 U.S. 735, 736–37 (1979).
106
Id. at 741.
107
Id. at 742.
108
Id. at 742–43.
109
Id. at 743.
110
See id. at 741.
111
See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665,
at *11–12 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
105
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C. Early Internet Cases: Fourth Amendment Protections
Beginning in the late 1990s, courts were asked to decide whether
Internet users had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information held by their ISP. One of the earliest opinions to
112
decide this question was United States v. Hambrick, a 1999 decision
from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. In
Hambrick, a New Hampshire police officer posing as a fourteen-yearold engaged in an anonymous chat-room discussion with an individu113
al who used the screen name “Blowuinva.”
The officer suspected
that “Blowuinva” intended to entice a minor to leave New Hamp114
After determining that “Blowuinva” was using a computer
shire.
115
with IP address 207.69.169.92 assigned by ISP MindSpring, the officer prepared a subpoena (later deemed defective) that ordered
MindSpring to release records and personal information on the sub116
scriber to whom it had assigned that IP address. MindSpring complied with the subpoena and provided investigators with Hambrick’s
name, address, credit card number, e-mail address, and phone num117
bers. Police used this information to search Hambrick’s residence,
118
where they ultimately found incriminating evidence.
Hambrick challenged the evidence that flowed from the defective subpoena and sought to suppress all the information provided by
119
MindSpring. The district court denied Hambrick’s motion by first
holding that the ECPA (under which the SCA was passed) was not a
legislative mandate that an Internet subscriber has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name, address, social security number,
120
credit card number, and proof of Internet connection. The court
also rejected the notion that Hambrick’s subjective expectation of

112

55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, Hambrick, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
18665.
113
Id. at 505.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 505–06. The subpoena was invalid because another detective in the same
local police department had approved it. Id. at 506.
117
Id. at 505.
118
United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *5
(4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
119
Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
120
Id. at 507.
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privacy was one that society was willing to recognize as reasonable because he had knowingly revealed his personal information to his ISP,
he had chosen a screen name that was linked to his true identity recorded in the ISP’s records, and the ISP’s employees had access to this
121
information in the ordinary course of business.
From this, the
court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the
122
information that the police obtained from the ISP. Because Hambrick had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, it
was not protected under the Fourth Amendment, and suppression of
the information was therefore not an available remedy in the crimi123
nal trial.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
124
district court’s decision in an unreported opinion. The court relied
heavily on Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller and quickly
concluded that “the information at issue in this case is not distinguishable from the materials in Miller and Smith, as the government
125
The court limited its
merely obtained non-content information.”
holding to finding that no Fourth Amendment privacy interest exists
126
in non-content information.
Hambrick was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Guest v. Leis, which also held that Internet users do not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information when they convey that information to a third party such as a sys127
tem operator of a Bulletin Board System or an ISP.
Many subsequent federal decisions followed Guest and, as a result, discarded
privacy rights for Internet users by relying on the third-party doctrine
128
from Miller. For example, in 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

121

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
123
Id. at 510.
124
United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *14
(4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam).
125
Id. at *12 n.4.
126
Id. at *13–14.
127
255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001)..
128
See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 2007); Freedman v. Am. Online,
Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d
843 (D. Md. 2005).
122
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Tenth Circuit in United States v. Perrine considered whether law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment and the SCA when it ob129
In Perrine, a civitained an Internet user’s subscriber information.
lian showed local police the transcript of a conversation he had with
“stevedragonslayer” in a Yahoo! chat room where “stevedragonslayer”
130
had played several videos depicting child pornography. Police obtained a court order pursuant to the SCA ordering Yahoo! to disclose
the IP address of the individual using the “stevedragonslayer” screen
131
name. With the IP address provided by Yahoo!, police next determined that Cox Communications had registered the IP address, and
police ordered Cox to provide subscriber information for the IP ad132
dress. From this, police issued a search warrant for Perrine’s house,
seized his computer, and discovered thousands of images of child
133
pornography on the computer’s hard drive.
Perrine challenged the evidence on two grounds: first, that the
government failed to show “specific and articulable” facts as required
134
to obtain a court order under the SCA; and second, that the search
135
violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court rejected both argu136
It concluded that the affidavits in support of the court orments.
der showed specific and articulable facts to show that the information
sought was relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga137
tion. With respect to Perrine’s Fourth Amendment claim, the court
concluded that because Perrine had voluntarily provided Cox and
Yahoo! with his personal information and had enabled peer-to-peer
file sharing on his computer, he could have no reasonable expecta138
tion of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

518 F.3d at 1201.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1204.
Id. at 1202–04.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
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IV. THE NEW JERSEY CASE OF STATE V. REID
In the wake of countless federal court decisions finding no privacy interests in personal information held by an ISP, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey reached the opposite conclusion in its 2008 decision in State v. Reid, holding that an Internet user has a reasonable
139
expectation of privacy in subscriber information given to an ISP.
Under Reid, information improperly obtained by law enforcement
from an ISP must be suppressed to deter future police misconduct
140
and to encourage respect for protected rights.
In Reid, an IT specialist for a supplier’s Web site noticed that
someone had logged into one of his customer’s accounts, changed
the customer’s shipping address to a nonexistent address, and then
141
changed the login password to the customer’s account.
The supplier’s Web site captured the hacker’s IP address of 68.32.145.220,
142
which was registered to Comcast.
The IT specialist informed the
143
customer about the suspected hacker and gave him the IP address.
The customer first attempted to obtain subscriber information for
the IP address directly from Comcast, but predictably, Comcast de144
clined to respond without a subpoena.
The customer next con145
tacted the local police and gave them the IP address.
A detective
obtained a subpoena duces tecum from the local municipal court to
command Comcast to turn over information regarding IP address
146
68.32.145.220.
Comcast complied, providing information that im147
plicated defendant Shirley Reid, who was subsequently indicted and

139

945 A.2d 26, 28 (N.J. 2008).
Id. at 37.
141
Id. at 29.
142
Id. Web sites such as Whois.net can provide the name of the ISP to whom a
particular IP address is registered. See Whois By IP Address, http://tools.whois.net/
whoisbyip/ (last visited June 22, 2010). For example, by typing “68.32.145.220” into
the search box on the Whois By IP Address Web page, one can learn that the address
is registered to Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. NJ-SOUTH. Id.
143
Reid, 945 A.2d at 29.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 29–30.
140
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charged for computer-related theft in violation of a New Jersey sta148
tute.
At trial, the court granted Reid’s motion to suppress after finding that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal
information held by her ISP and that the resulting search violated
Reid’s state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches because the subpoena issued by the municipal court was de149
fective.
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court
affirmed the trial court’s order of suppression, and the State ap150
pealed.
After framing the question as whether “Internet subscribers have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity while accessing
Internet [Web sites],” the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber
151
information provided to an ISP. After recognizing the importance
of computers and the Internet to everyday modern life, the Reid court
compared ISP records with telephone and bank records, both of
which New Jersey had already afforded greater privacy protections
152
than those available under federal law. The court recognized that
Internet users provide information to an ISP for the limited purpose
of gaining use of the ISP and not for the purpose of allowing the ISP
153
to release their private information to others. To respect an Internet user’s privacy, police seeking a user’s personally identifiable information from an ISP must obtain a grand jury subpoena based on a
relevancy standard, and information obtained in violation of proper
154
procedure must be suppressed.
The court affirmed that the fact
that the subpoena issued by the municipal court was defective mandated suppression of evidence seized pursuant to it—namely, Reid’s
155
subscriber information. The court noted, however, that Comcast’s
subscriber information existed independently of the faulty process

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 30.
Reid, 945 A.2d at 30.
Id.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36–37.
Reid, 945 A.2d at 37.
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the police followed and that the tainted police conduct did not affect
156
that information. Thus, under those circumstances, the State could
attempt to reacquire the information with a proper grand jury subpoena limited to seeking the user information for the IP address at
157
issue.
V. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS TO INTERNET PRIVACY LAW
Reid represents a decision where everyone won. Defendant Reid
won because the court recognized her interest in maintaining as pri158
vate the information linked to her IP address.
The State won because it could reacquire through proper means the information it
159
New Jersey resisought and it could continue to prosecute Reid.
dents also won because they can continue to use the Internet with
confidence that law enforcement cannot arbitrarily demand their
personal information from an ISP, and if law enforcement violates
this privacy right in obtaining such personal information, the infor160
mation obtained may be subject to exclusion in a criminal trial.
Thus, Reid provided a realistic approach that embraced modern considerations of privacy interests in Internet use. Past federal decisions
have not shown the same level of insight and balancing of interests as
Reid.
Society’s increasing reliance on the Internet for everyday activi161
ties is obvious. Statistics place the number of Internet users in the
United States at 231 million, or approximately seventy-five percent of
162
the population. Recognizing the importance the Internet holds in
everyday life, the Supreme Court of New Jersey acknowledged that

156

Id.
Id. at 38.
158
See id. at 33–34.
159
See id. at 38.
160
See id. at 37.
161
See Reid, 945 A.2d at 33 (“[I]t is hard to overstate how important computers
and the Internet have become to everyday, modern life.”).
162
See Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited June 22, 2010)
(estimating the population of the United States at 310,232,863 people as of July
2010).
157
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Internet users expect that their “identity will not be discovered
163
through a string of numbers left behind” on a Web site.
One might look at Reid and wonder whether the federal courts’
approaches to answering Internet-privacy cases by applying the third164
party doctrine of United States v. Miller —which dealt with banks and
bank records—was proper. Was it appropriate to compare the information held by an ISP to the information held and used by a
bank? Or did this analogy simply offer federal judges with a quick
and easy way to deal with the oftentimes confusing venue of Internet
165
privacy?
Those who are comfortable with Internet technology
might realize that the legal doctrines and analogies established before the mid-1990s do not neatly lend themselves to issues of Internet
privacy. Furthermore, the statutory provisions available to Internet
users to protect the users from disclosure of their personal information by an ISP are insufficient relative to the importance of Internet
use in today’s society.
A. Limited Remedies Available Following an Unlawful Search
Internet users who become the subject of a search of their ISP’s
records have few remedies should law enforcement illegally obtain
this information. First, the traditional remedy of suppression of unlawfully seized evidence under the Fourth Amendment is generally
166
not available. In a criminal trial, the government cannot generally
proffer in its case-in-chief evidence obtained in violation of the de167
If, however, the area of gofendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
vernmental intrusion falls outside of the scope of Fourth Amendment

163

Reid, 945 A.2d at 35.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
165
Federal courts have routinely applied the third-party doctrine to hold that an
Internet user has no Fourth Amendment privacy expectation in the information
linked to her IP address. See cases cited supra note 13.
166
See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (D. Mass. 2007); Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 183 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Sherr, 400 F.
Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005).
167
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be used in criminal prosecutions in
state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
164
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protection, the defendant may not challenge the intrusion. Consequently, the defendant cannot seek suppression of the evidence in a
169
criminal trial. With the federal courts’ announcement that Internet
users’ expectations of privacy in the subscriber information held by
their ISP is not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment, users
cannot seek to have information obtained by law enforcement
through unlawful methods suppressed at a criminal trial.
Second, Internet users have no remedies for suppression
through the SCA because the few remedies the SCA does offer are
limited and provide virtually no protection to a defendant in the
170
criminal courtroom.
If law enforcement deviates from the procedures set forth in § 2703, an individual harmed may bring an action
against the United States for damages and reasonably incurred litiga171
tion costs.
This, however, is the exclusive remedy against the gov172
ernment available under the SCA.
The SCA does not provide for
suppression in a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of its
173
provisions, and federal courts have refused to read suppression as a
174
remedy into the SCA.

168
See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1978) (holding that the
proper analysis to determine whether a defendant may challenge a search focuses on
the extent of the defendant’s substantive Fourth Amendment rights rather than on
the question of standing).
169
See id. at 134 (holding that “since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, . . . it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the
rule’s protections” (internal citations omitted)).
170
See 18 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2006).
171
See id.
172
See § 2712(e). Remedies in the form of civil actions are also limited. Section
2703(e) restricts the use of civil actions by a subscriber against an ISP. § 2703(e). It
prohibits an aggrieved person from bringing a civil action against an ISP who provided law enforcement with information in accordance with the terms of a court order, warrant, subpoena, statutory authorization, or certification. Id. Section 2707
allows an aggrieved person to bring a civil action for injunctive or declaratory relief,
damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs incurred only
where the ISP knowingly or intentionally violated the provisions of the SCA. § 2707.
173
18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) (“The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of
this chapter.”).
174
See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008); see also
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Smith,
155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998); Bansal v. Russ, 513 F. Supp. 2d 264, 282–83
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With no threat of suppression under the Fourth Amendment
and no statutorily mandated suppression, little remains to deter law
enforcement from deviating from the requirements of the SCA when
it seeks information from an ISP. As a result, those who subscribe to
an Internet service are at risk that law enforcement will obtain their
personal information without regard to playing by the rules.
B. Shortcomings of the Stored Communications Act
The SCA fails to adequately protect an Internet user’s privacy interests because it lacks suitable guidance for the courts to follow when
interpreting the statute. For example, it distinguishes between a
“record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” under
§ 2703(c)(1) and the list of items available to law enforcement under
§ 2703(c)(2) (which includes the subscriber’s name, address, phone
numbers, IP address, and credit card or bank account information),
but the statute fails to explain how these two categories are different.
Furthermore, the SCA distinguishes between content and non175
content in an Internet communication, but it does not provide the
courts with clear guidance to determine the difference between con176
For examtent and non-content in light of changing technology.
ple, law enforcement could locate a blog post, which undoubtedly
contains content, obtain the IP address of the computer that sent the
post, and then require the ISP to provide the missing link—the blogger’s name and address. This is how law enforcement links noncontent, which is easy to obtain through the SCA, to content, which
177
generally requires a warrant or a court order.
Courts have struggled to understand the SCA. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed its frustration that
“[u]nderstanding the [SCA] requires understanding and applying its
many technical terms as defined by the Act, as well as engaging in
178
painstaking, methodical analysis.”
The Ninth Circuit expressed
similar dissatisfaction, complaining that “the existing statutory
(E.D. Pa. 2007); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005);
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
175
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
176
See In re Pen Register & Trap / Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396
F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (suggesting that parts of the SCA are “murky”).
177
See § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A).
178
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994).
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framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communica179
tion.” The court concluded that “until Congress brings the laws in
line with modern technology,” protection of the Internet and Web
180
sites “will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the law.”
Scholar Orin Kerr suggests that the SCA provides sufficient protections to Internet users because it places limits on the ability of an
ISP to disclose subscriber information, whereas the Fourth Amend181
ment does not.
The “limit” imposed on the government before it
can obtain personal information on an Internet subscriber, however,
is negligible—it merely requires the government to serve an adminis182
trative subpoena to the ISP.
An administrative subpoena requires
no showing of probable cause by law enforcement; the information
sought need only be “relevant” to an authorized law enforcement in183
quiry.
Should law enforcement fail to meet this minimal requirement, very little is available in the way of remedies to the party whose
184
privacy interests were violated. Furthermore, Congress has not updated the SCA quickly enough to reflect modern Internet use, and
thus, the SCA has failed to keep pace with the rapid development of
Internet communications. For example, although § 2703 has been
amended several times since its inception, most of the amendments
have reduced subscriber privacy protections and made it easier for law
185
enforcement to obtain subscriber information from an ISP.
In
1986 the drafters of the SCA surely could not have envisioned the de-

179

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
181
Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 816 (2003) (claiming that
the privacy protections offered by the ECPA exceed those offered by constitutional
standards).
182
See § 2703(c)(2).
183
Id. § 3486(a)(1)(C)(i). Section 3486 controls the issuance of administrative
subpoenas for the investigation of a federal offense involving the sexual exploitation
or abuse of children. § 3486(a)(1)(A)(i)(II). A subpoena issued to an ISP in the
context of the SCA must not extend beyond the information listed under §
2703(c)(2), which this Comment refers to as “detailed subscriber information.” See
§ 3486(a)(1)(C)(i).
184
See supra Part V.A.
185
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No.107-56, §§ 209(2), 210, 212(b)(1), 220(a)(1), (b), 115 Stat. 283, 285, 291, 292
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
180
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velopment of open wireless networks on nearly every suburban street
corner and the cell phones equipped with full Internet access that are
commonplace today. The opportunities and means for individuals to
communicate via the Internet will only continue to grow.
Some scholars, perhaps in an effort to simplify the explanation
of the difference between the content and the non-content portions
of an Internet communication, compare an Internet communication
186
to a letter sent via the postal service.
The content portion of the
communication is akin to the letter located inside the envelope, and
the non-content portion of the communication—the header—is akin
to the destination address and return address found on the outside of
187
the envelope. This analogy is flawed. First, many Internet users are
likely unaware that their IP address is embedded in every mouse click
that they make across the Internet. And second, most Internet users
could not likely disable their IP address from appearing as part of an
Internet communication. Yet almost everyone knows how to drop an
anonymous letter with no return address into a mailbox.
Rather than providing Internet users with broad privacy protection, the SCA has done the opposite. It has evolved into a powerful
tool on which law enforcement relies to gain access to an Internet us188
er’s personal information.
It has given law enforcement broad liberties to search Internet-based communications by defining electronic privacy narrowly and by reducing the required showing by the
189
government to obtain information from an ISP.

186
See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611–16 (2003) (“[E]very communications network
features two types of information: the contents of communications, and the addressing and routing information that the networks use to deliver the contents of communications. The former is ‘content information,’ and the latter is ‘envelope information.’ The essential distinction between content and envelope information
remains constant across different technologies, from postal mail to e-mail.”).
187
See id. at 611 (“The envelope information is the information derived from the
outside of the envelope, including the mailing and return addresses, the stamp and
postmark, and the size and weight of the envelope when sealed.”).
188
See JAMES A. ADAMS, NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, COMMENTARY, 18 U.S.C.S.
prec. § 2701 (LexisNexis 2008) (“In addition to attempting to breach the shield of
computer privacy by a search for stored electronic information on individual computers or through Internet Service Providers, the Government is now using computers as a sword to obtain, compare and store information about individuals.”).
189
See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated,
564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
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C. Problems with Past Precedent
Early decisions that addressed whether Internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information held by
their ISPs may have been flawed for two reasons. First, the judges
who decided some of the earliest cases—which ended up providing
precedent for subsequent decisions—may have had an insufficient
working knowledge of Internet technology necessary to reach an informed decision. Second, the courts relied on doctrines that were ill
suited to answer the question of whether Internet users maintained
an expectation of privacy in the information held by their ISPs.
Those early court decisions thus provided inadequate constraints on
unwanted governmental prying.
1.

Wrestling with the Technology

The judges who decided some of the earliest Internet privacy
cases may have lacked a solid understanding of the technology necessary to make an informed decision. Many judges generally did not
have experience with Internet technology, and thus, cases involving
190
Internet issues were likely more difficult to decide. Courts that did
not understand fully the technology on which they were asked to rule
191
may have created unworkable rules.
Many courts admitted their shortcomings in the area of new
technology. In 1999 the district court judge in Hambrick acknowledged the “difficult” task of analyzing “previously unadjudicated situ192
ations in the world of cyberspace.”
The Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court self-consciously stumbled on the technology in its Reid decision by concluding that because the defendant
used an “anonymous ISP address,” she “manifested an intention to
keep her identity publicly anonymous. She could have used her own
name or some other ISP address that would have readily revealed her

190
See Orin Kerr, Internet Accounts and Probable Cause to Search a Home, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, Aug. 18, 2005, http://volokh.com/posts/1124409198.shtml.
191
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 879 (2004).
192
United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 18665 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam).
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193

identity, but she did not.” The court appeared to confuse the ISPassigned IP address with a user-selected screen name.
Some judges are not shy about admitting their lack of experience in handling technically challenging Internet cases. They even
“pride themselves on their lack of technological skills and wear it like
194
a badge of honor.”
One judge cited “an acknowledged dearth of
technological savvy on the part of the undersigned” as a reason to refrain from elaborating on the possible definitions of “contents” in the
195
context of the Pen Register Statute. Many of the lawyers who tried
early Internet cases may not have helped either because, as Orin Kerr
claims, they were no more prepared to handle the technically com196
plex Internet cases than the judges were to hear them.
Kerr argues that legislatures are in a better position than the
courts to provide privacy protection for areas affected by new tech197
nologies. According to Kerr, whereas cases involving “stable” technologies (such as automobiles) tend to be regulated by the courts
under the Fourth Amendment, cases involving new “technologies
198
tend to be regulated by statute.” Why is this so? Do federal courts
consciously avoid deciding technology issues and defer the development of technology-based privacy law to the legislature? While it may
be difficult to answer that question, one fact remains: as a result of

193
State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), aff’d, modified,
and remanded, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008). This fact was noted with some amusement by
a Wired Network Blogger who aptly noted that defendant Reid did not “‘choose’
anonymity since she made no attempt to mask her ‘ISP address[.’] Maybe she ignorantly thought she was anonymous, but she certainly wasn’t.” Ryan Singel, Jerseyites
Have Right to Protect “ISP Address,” WIRED.COM, Jan. 23, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2007/01/jerseyites_have.html.
194
Donald E. Shelton, Teaching Technology to Judges, 40 JUDGES J. 42, 42 (2001).
195
In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap on [xxx]
Internet Service Account / User Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49
(D. Mass. 2005) (“There may be other examples of instances in which ‘dialing,
routing, addressing and signaling information,’ reveals the ‘contents’ of communications as ‘contents’ is defined. Due to time constraints . . . and an acknowledged
dearth of technological savvy on the part of the undersigned, the Court will not at
this time try to identify and discuss them.”).
196
See KERR, supra note 38, at 423 (“[C]omputer technologies are new, and relatively few lawyers are sufficiently knowledgeable about them to raise creative challenges to government practices.”).
197
See Kerr, supra note 191, at 888.
198
Id.
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recent federal court decisions, large portions of Internet privacy protections have been carved out from the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, and this leaves Internet users who desire greater privacy
protections at the mercy of Congress. Furthermore, the courts cannot avoid interpreting the sometimes confusing and overwhelmingly
technical statutes that touch Internet-privacy issues. Thus, Kerr’s
suggestion that “courts should be wary of imposing broad privacy pro199
tections against the government’s use of new technologies” is not
necessarily the proper solution. The better choice is for courts to become more fluent with Internet technology and how it potentially affects an individual’s privacy interests. This responsibility also flows to
the attorneys who are trying cases and who have the opportunity to
educate the bench via briefs and oral arguments.
2.

Criticisms of Katz and Miller

The foundation of Internet privacy jurisprudence—Katz and Miller—has left modern Internet users on a weak footing when it comes
to protecting privacy interests. One widely recognized problem with
Justice Harlan’s Katz test is that the second prong of the test—which
requires a showing that the privacy interest sought is one that society
recognizes as reasonable—may never be met in a particular area if
the government or the Supreme Court were to announce that society
200
no longer has any privacy interest in that area.
For example,
homeowners generally enjoy an expectation of privacy in the contents of their garages. In this hypothetical, Congress could, in an interest to crack down on the growing problem of car thefts, enact a
new statute that allows federal agents to search private garages at any
time. Under the new statute, homeowners would quickly adjust to
the idea that their garages were no longer private, and thus, the
second prong of the Katz test would never be met if a homeowner
201
challenged a search of a private garage.
Justice Scalia referred to
the Katz test as “self-indulgent” because, “unsurprisingly, those actual
(subjective) expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recog199

Id.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) (noting that “where an individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,” those subjective expectations cannot play
a meaningful role in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
201
Justice Blackman used a hypothetical similar to this in Smith. Id.
200
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nize as reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those expecta202
tions of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”
The same
could be true of the expectations of privacy that Congress considers
reasonable. Simply an applicable statute can suggest whether an ex203
pectation of privacy in a particular area is reasonable.
Thus, Congress can inform the courts that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular area by enacting a statute that
204
indicates as much.
Over twenty years after Miller was decided, courts rekindled the
Miller rule to hold that the government’s use of an IP address to obtain an Internet subscriber’s personal information from the subscriber’s ISP did not amount to a “search” and thus received no Fourth
205
Amendment protection. Federal courts have stubbornly refused to
discard the third-party doctrine from Miller when evaluating Internet
privacy cases and by doing so have announced that an ISP is just like
206
a bank.
But in Miller, part of the Court’s reasoning derived from
the fact that Congress had already eliminated a bank user’s expectation
207
of privacy when it enacted the Bank Secrecy Act. The Bank Secrecy
Act required banks to maintain records and provide to law enforcement certain reports that would “have a high degree of usefulness in
208
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.”
Thus,
when the Miller Court considered the question of the constitutionality
of the Bank Secrecy Act, Justice Douglas aptly predicted in his dissent
that “[i]t would be highly useful to governmental espionage to have
like reports from all our bookstores, all our hardware and retail

202
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal
quotes and citation omitted).
203
See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that applicable statutes can suggest whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
204
See id. (“[T]he ECPA grants the government broad liberty to search online materials by defining electronic privacy narrowly.”).
205
See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hambrick,
No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *12 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
206
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 128.
207
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
208
Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26 (1974) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1829b(a)(2), 1951 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§ 5311 (2006))).

TYSON (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

7/12/2010 5:01 PM

COMMENT

1291

stores, all our drugstores. These records too might be ‘useful’ in
209
criminal investigations.”
Many states have diverged from Miller and concluded that, on
the basis of their state constitutions, bank customers have an expecta210
tion that their bank records will remain private. One court referred
to the doctrines developed by the federal courts as “extraordinarily
restrictive” and having the “effect, if not the purpose, of placing a
large percentage of illegal [searches] beyond the scrutiny of the
211
courts.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that “the advent of modern technology, coupled with the ubiquity of commercial
banking, underscores both the ability of prying government eyes to
obtain bank records and the need to protect ordinary citizens’ finan212
cial privacy in ways that promote fairness.”
For these same reasons, courts should refrain from applying the
third-party doctrine from Miller when law enforcement seeks subscriber information from an ISP based on an IP address. While it is
true that Internet subscribers do knowingly expose personally identifiable information to their ISPs, the same is not true for their IP ad-

209

Id. at 84–85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 594 (Cal. 1974) (holding that
a bank customer’s reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal
process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be used by the bank only for internal
banking purposes); Charnes v. Digiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Colo. 1980) (holding that taxpayer bank depositor has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank
records of his financial transactions); Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep’t
of Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in financial-institution records); State v. Thompson,
745 P.2d 1087, 1096 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (noting that “services of banks, like those
of telephone companies, are indispensable in today’s business environment” and
that “the disclosure of information to telephone companies or banks ought not to be
treated as an abdication of a privacy interest”); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88–
89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (rejecting Miller and noting that “[s]ince it is virtually impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining
an account with a bank, opening a bank account is not entirely volitional and should
not be seen as conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation of privacy”);
State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875 (N.J. 2005) (same); Commonwealth v. DeJohn,
403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979) (holding that bank customers have a legitimate expectation of privacy in records pertaining to their affairs kept at the bank); State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (same); State v. Popenhagen, 749 N.W.2d 611,
632 (Wis. 2008) (holding that suppression of defendant’s bank records is an appropriate remedy when the bank records were obtained in violation of a state statute).
211
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
212
McAllister, 875 A.2d at 875.
210
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dresses. An Internet subscriber cannot “knowingly expose to the
public” something of which the subscriber is unaware. The ISP (not
the subscriber) generates and assigns the IP address, and the sub213
scriber has no control over the process. The IP address associated
with an Internet subscriber is like an envelope with no return ad214
dress—inherently anonymous. This is why the third-party doctrine
does not provide a workable framework for Internet cases. As one
court stated,
The long history of the third-party doctrine—removing constitutional protection to information disclosed to a third party on the
ground that the third party has the technical ability to disclose the
information to the government—may not be compatible with the
typical expectations of the general populace, notwithstanding its
215
sophistication and computer savviness.

Unlike the expectations for communications sent via postal mail,
which are still sorted manually at the local post office and hand delivered by a carrier, the typical expectations of the general populace
using the Internet today do not include the expectation that a live
human handles each communication individually. And unlike a typical face-to-face transaction that occurs at a local bank when customers
walk in to cash a paycheck, make a deposit, or simply inquire as to
their account balance, Internet subscribers likely believe that their
electronic communications do not involve any contact with a human
but are instead controlled by switches, routers, and other computers.
Even Google assures Gmail users that “no humans” are involved in its
generation of targeted advertisements, which are based on keywords
216
located in the body of a Gmail message.
When an Internet user
213

Advanced Internet users seeking privacy have figured out ways to mask their IP
address by use of “anonymizing” software or third-party proxy servers such as PrivateProxy. See PrivateProxy, http://www.privateproxysoftware.com/anonymous_proxy_
personal.html (last visited June 14, 2010) (“Every time you connect to the Internet,
you leave an electronic trail. This trail leads back to your door. Protect yourself by
using an anonymous proxy to change your IP address. By using Private Proxy, you
can surf anonymously on the Internet. The trail will lead to us and not you!”).
214
See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“IP ‘addresses’ are generally considered envelope—not content—information.”), vacated,
564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
215
Id. at 397.
216
See Google Privacy FAQ, http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.html#toc-gmailads (last visited June 14, 2009) (Google uses “software to scan for keywords in users’
emails which we can then use to match ads. When a user opens an email message,
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“communicates” with a Web site, the only human involved is the one
who types on the keyboard or clicks with the mouse. For these reasons, the third-party doctrine from Miller should not apply to Internet
communications.
3.

Inadequate Constraints on Government Prying

A court’s conclusion that no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in a particular area has dire consequences, not just for the defendant in a criminal trial but also for the rest of society. As more
government activity falls outside of the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection, society suffers through a reduction of security and liberties. Justice Marshall predicted that “unregulated governmental
monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with
217
Scholar Daniel S. Solove suggested that
nothing illicit to hide.”
harmful consequences would result from “[i]nadequately constrained
218
government information-gathering.”
Those harms include a “slow
creep toward a totalitarian state,” a chill in democratic activities, and
219
interference with the right of self-determination. In the context of
Internet use, federal court opinions fail to recognize that most
people expect to use the Internet without the fear that law enforcement may arbitrarily track their usage.
Once a privacy interest falls outside of the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, violations of that interest are no longer subject
220
to the exclusionary rule.
Without an exclusionary rule, the incentive for law enforcement to adhere to proper methods of obtaining
information is nearly eliminated. Law enforcement may very well
take matters into its own hands, and yet the criminal defendant will
221
have no standing to challenge the government’s improper conduct.

computers scan the text and then instantaneously display relevant information. . . .
The whole process is automated and involves no humans.”).
217
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002).
219
Id. at 1084–85.
220
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1914).
221
See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (holding that an illegal
search conducted by law enforcement through use of a defective warrant may only be
challenged by a person with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1980) (finding no Fourth Amend-
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The result is not just harmful to the defendant in the particular case
but to society as a whole. New Jersey’s decision in State v. Reid recognized that the exclusionary rule helps deter police misconduct and
222
Because the statutory reencourages respect for protected rights.
gimes enacted by Congress to fill the void left by the inapplicability of
223
the Fourth Amendment are “woefully inadequate,” modern Internet users are left with very little protection against unwanted government prying.
D. Solutions for the Future: Rethink “Content” Under the SCA
As suggested above, courts deciding Internet privacy cases
should aim to better understand the technology and avoid reflexively
applying last century’s third-party doctrine. Additionally, courts
should consider more closely the delicate link between content and
identity before allowing that link to be broken with a mere administrative subpoena.
The SCA requires that if law enforcement already has the name
and personal information of an Internet subscriber and now wishes
to obtain the contents of that subscriber’s Internet-based communication, it must provide a search warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules
224
of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent state search warrant.
But
when law enforcement starts with the contents of a communication
made by an anonymous Internet user and wishes to link that content
to a subscriber record to obtain the user’s identity, it only needs to
225
prepare an administrative subpoena. In the first scenario, the link
between content and identity is protected by the requirement of a
search warrant supported by probable cause, but in the second scenario, it is not. The solution to this dichotomy is to rethink the meaning of “content” under the SCA.

ment standing to challenge illegal search where defendant’s bank records were illegally obtained by law enforcement upon breaking into a hotel room).
222
State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 37 (N.J. 2008).
223
Solove, supra note 218, at 1138.
224
See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring the government to obtain a
search warrant prior to the disclosure of the contents of an electronic communication).
225
§ 2703(c)(2).
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The Ninth Circuit has held that an “electronic communication”
226
includes the transfer of data when an individual accesses a Web site.
The court considered the sequence of events and transmissions that
occur between a subscriber and a Web site when the subscriber re227
quests a particular Web site to load.
The court recognized that a
Web site functions as an electronic communication because once the
subscriber requests data from the Web site, the server transmits spe228
cific documents to the subscriber’s computer. The Web site owner
transfers information (i.e., “contents” of the Web site) to the subscriber via one of the methods listed in the ECPA’s definition of
229
“electronic communication.”
If the act of clicking on a Web site is an electronic communication, what portion of that communication is “content?” Under the
SCA, “contents” includes any information concerning the substance,
230
purport, or meaning of a communication.
An Internet user who
logs in to her Earthlink e-mail account and sends a message to a
friend that says “meet at 5 p.m. to collect the package” expects that
the contents of this e-mail message (“meet at 5 p.m. to collect the
package”) will remain private. Likewise, when she uses Google to locate Web sites on “local home foreclosures” and clicks on the first
item in the search results list but does nothing more than view the
text and images from the Web page that appears on her monitor, she
expects that her identity will not be revealed from simply viewing the
page.
In both cases above, content-based information is involved.
Most would recognize the content in the first example as the message
“meet at 5 p.m. to collect the package.” In the second example, the
click on the search result created a communication between the subscriber and the Web site, with the text, images, and graphics flowing
from the Web site back to the subscriber’s computer making up the
“substance, purport or meaning” of that communication. The contents of a Web site viewed by a subscriber can reveal extraordinarily
private information about that individual that goes well beyond the

226
227
228
229
230

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication”).
§ 2510(8).
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subscriber’s name, address, or phone number. For example, law enforcement may make inferences after learning that a subscriber visited Web sites such as http://www.wikihow.com/Know-if-You-arePregnant; http://www.herpes.com/; or http://www.domesticviolence.org/
questions-about-leaving/.
In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
line between “content” and “non-content” in an Internet-based communication may not be as clear cut as Smith and Katz describe it to
231
be.
The court was asked to consider the constitutionality of the
government’s real-time surveillance of a subscriber’s Internet activity,
which included monitoring the IP addresses of the Web sites the sub232
scriber visited. Comparing the real-time collection of IP addresses
with the use of a pen register to collect phone numbers in Smith v.
Maryland, the court held that the government’s surveillance did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search because IP addresses only
constitute addressing information and do not reveal any more about
the underlying contents of a communication than does a phone
233
number. After claiming that Smith and Katz drew a “clear line” between unprotected addressing information and protected content,
the court seemed to concede that the line is not so clear when it
234
comes to Internet-based communications.
The court noted that a
surveillance method that allowed the government to determine not
only the IP address of a Web site but also the URL of a particular
page within a Web site might be more “constitutionally” problematic
because the URL identifies a particular document within the site and
“thus reveals much more information about the person’s Internet ac235
tivity.”
But Forrester’s distinction between the level of content that
appears on the home page of a Web site compared to the content
that could appear within a particular URL of the Web site is misplaced. While a URL does point to a specific page within an overall
Web site, the home page of a Web site could just as easily contain a

231
232
233
234
235

512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 505, 509–11.
Id. at 510.
See id.
Id. at 510 n.6.
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particular document that “reveals much more information about the
236
person’s Internet activity.”
In Forrester, the court recognized the potential privacy issue of
connecting a known subscriber to particular content. Yet law enforcement frequently connects a subscriber to content but from the
other direction. Law enforcement starts with the content by first
identifying a particular Web page. It next obtains the IP address of
the computer that was used to access that page, and finally it obtains
from the ISP the subscriber information to whom the IP address is
237
registered.
Should the minimum required level of suspicion by law enforcement vary according to whether law enforcement needs to connect content to a subscriber or a subscriber to content? If the act of a
subscriber viewing a particular Web site constitutes an electronic
238
communication and that communication includes content—the
specific text, audio, graphic, or video files associated with the particular Web site—should not the government be required to obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause (as opposed to a mere administrative subpoena) before it can connect the content of the communication to the subscriber? Anything less fails to protect an Internet
subscriber’s desire to retain privacy and anonymity in the Web sites
the subscriber viewed. Thus, the government should be required to
obtain a warrant or court order when it seeks the personally identifiable information on an Internet subscriber.
VI. CONCLUSION
No one can deny the important role that the Internet plays in
everyday life. People rely on the Internet to communicate with business colleagues and life-long friends, pay bills, purchase books, learn
about recent news events, and stay in touch with family members.
And society expects privacy in using the Internet regardless of wheth-

236

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 386–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(describing how law enforcement first identified a particular Web site, obtained the
access log records listing the IP addresses of 1900 different users who had logged
onto the Web site, identified the ISPs to whom the IP addresses were registered, and
finally administratively subpoenaed the ISPs to disclose the identities of the subscribers), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
238
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
237
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er federal courts are willing to recognize such a privacy interest. The
content of a Web site can reveal highly personal information about
the individual who visits it, and the personally identifiable information attached to an IP address deserves greater privacy protections
than federal courts and legislation presently allow. Courts should
recognize that the first generation of Internet privacy decisions relied
on antiquated doctrines and that these decisions might not help a
modern court resolve privacy questions. Furthermore, the SCA does
not provide a suitable substitute for Fourth Amendment protections
because modern Internet use has outgrown the SCA’s useful application.
New Jersey’s decision in State v. Reid moved Internet privacy a
step in the right direction. By recognizing that Internet users maintain an expectation of privacy in the subscriber information held by
their ISPs, New Jersey reinstated Internet privacy without unduly frustrating law enforcement’s goals of catching criminals. Federal courts
ought to extract themselves from the rigid framework of the thirdparty doctrine and consider New Jersey’s approach to protecting Internet users’ interest in the privacy of their subscriber information
held by their ISPs.

